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In this essay we review what is known about Head Start and argue that the program is likely to generate
benefits to participants and society as a whole that are large enough to justify the program's costs.
Our conclusions differ importantly from those offered in some previous reviews because we use a
more appropriate standard to judge the success of Head Start (namely, benefit-cost analysis), draw
on new accumulating evidence for Head Start's long-term effects on early cohorts of program participants,
and discuss why common interpretations of a recent randomized experimental evaluation of Head
Start's short-term impacts may be overly pessimistic.  While in principle there could be more beneficial
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  Few social programs seem to enjoy the widespread popular support of Head 
Start.
1  Poor children represent a sympathetic target population for social programs 
[Mayer, 1997].  The powerful correlation between the socio-economic status of a child’s 
family and their long-term life chances raises concerns about the fairness of American 
society as well as the social costs associated with outcomes such as school dropout or 
criminal behavior [Holzer et al., 2007].  And the fact that the educational deficits of poor 
children show up very early in the life course, even well before children start 
kindergarten, provides a powerful logic for intervening early [Knudsen et al., 2006]. 
  Despite the obvious emotional and intuitive appeal of Head Start, questions about 
Head Start’s effectiveness have dogged the program since its inception.  The first study 
claiming that Head Start’s benefits fade out was published in 1966 – just one year after 
the program was launched as part of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty 
[Westinghouse, 1969; Vinovskis, 2005].  Skepticism about the program persists in some 
quarters to the present day.  The perspective of the Cato Institute’s Darcy Ann Olsen is 
nicely summarized by the title of her policy brief:  It’s Time to Stop Head Start.
2  
Douglas J. Besharov’s assessment is slightly more charitable, but only slightly, as 
suggested by the title of his policy brief:  Head Start’s Broken Promise.
3  Understanding 
                                                 
1 For example in a 1995 opinion poll, two-thirds of voters in Colorado agreed with the statement “School 
districts should be required to provide special preschool classes to children from low income households to 
get them prepared for grade school” (Memorandum to the Donnell-Kay Foundation from Public Opinion 
Strategies, September 7, 2005; available at www.pos.org/presentations/77/preschool.pdf ).  The fraction of 
voters agreeing with this statement exceeds the fraction of Colorado votes in the 1996 presidential elections 
that went to Bill Clinton by nearly 22 percentage points.  As another example, Head Start funding has 
increased dramatically under both Republican and Democratic presidential administrations (particularly the 
administrations of George HW Bush and Bill Clinton); see Haskins [2004]. 
2 Darcy Ann Olsen, “It’s Time to Stop Head Start,” Human Events, September 1, 2000. 
3 Douglas J. Besharov, “Head Start’s Broken Promise,” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research On the Issues, October 2005. Head Start’s impacts on poor children seems particularly urgent given that the program  
is up for re-authorization this year in the U.S. Congress. 
This essay reviews what is known about the value of Head Start.  Our bottom line 
is that the best available evidence suggests Head Start passes a benefit-cost test.  While 
there remain some important limitations to the available evidence on Head Start, we 
believe the weight of the evidence points in this direction.  In principle there might be 
ways to increase the cost-effectiveness of current Head Start funding, including changes 
to Head Start’s design or funding alternatives such as state pre-K programs.  However the 
benefits of such changes remain uncertain and they entail some downside risk. 
Our essay seeks to develop five main arguments that lead us to these conclusions.  
First, much of the debate about Head Start stems from confusion about how to judge the 
magnitude of program impacts.  We argue that the most appropriate standard for judging 
the program’s success is benefit-cost analysis. 
Second, over the past several years new evidence has been accumulating about 
the long-term impacts of Head Start on early cohorts of program participants, as well as 
about the short-term program impacts on more recent cohorts of children.  Research on 
Head Start’s long-term impacts suggests the program passed a benefit-cost test during the 
first few decades of operation [Currie and Thomas, 1995; Garces, Thomas and Currie, 
2002; Ludwig and Miller, 2007].  These findings counter the view that only very 
intensive (and expensive) early childhood interventions can generate long-term benefits, 
and also run counter to the perception that Head Start has been a failure from its 
inception.  However these results are not directly informative about whether today’s 
version of Head Start passes a benefit-cost test, since Head Start and the counterfactual 
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 developmental environments poor children would otherwise experience are both 
changing over time.  This is a generic challenge to understanding the long-term impacts 
of contemporaneous government programs – we can only estimate long-term impacts for 
people who participated in the program a long time ago. 
The best evidence currently available on Head Start as it operates today comes 
from a recent randomized experimental evaluation of Head Start’s impacts measured 
within one year of random assignment, which was sponsored by the federal government 
and carried out by Westat [Puma et al., 2005].  Public discussions of the experimental 
results have typically focused on the effects of being assigned to the experiment’s 
treatment group rather than the control group, known in the program evaluation literature 
as the “intent to treat” (ITT) impact.  These impacts are presented by Westat separately 
for 3 and 4 year old program participants and are usually in the direction consistent with 
some beneficial impact of Head Start on children’s short term outcomes, but are often not 
statistically significant. 
The third objective of our paper is to provide some benchmarks for how large 
these short-term impacts would need to be in order to believe that any long-term benefits 
generated by today’s Head Start program will be enough to justify the program’s costs.  
This exercise is complicated by the fact that there is currently limited evidence about how 
the cognitive and non-cognitive skills of young children translate into long-term life 
outcomes.  With this caveat in mind, the evidence that is available suggests that given 
Head Start’s costs (around $7,000 per child on average), the program would pass a 
benefit-cost test if the short-term impacts on achievement test scores were equal to 
around .1 to .2 standard deviations, or maybe even much smaller still. 
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 If our achievement test-score benchmarks are correct, then the expected benefits 
from Head Start are likely to exceed the program’s costs.  The effects of being assigned 
to the Head Start experimental treatment group (the intent to treat effects) are typically on 
the order of .1 to .2 standard deviations.  However the estimated effects of Head Start 
participation itself (the “effects of treatment on the treated,” or TOT) are estimated to be 
around 1.5 times as large as the intent-to-treat impacts.  The difference between the 
effects of being assigned to the experimental treatment group and the effects of Head 
Start participation per se (that is, ITT versus TOT) stems from the fact that not all 
treatment-group children actually enrolled in Head Start, while some children assigned to 
the control group wound up enrolling in Head Start on their own. 
Some observers have focused on the fact that many of the estimated impacts in 
the recent randomized experimental evaluation of Head Start are not statistically 
significant, and so follow the usual scientific convention of assuming that any estimates 
that cannot be statistically distinguished from zero are zero.  Our own calculations 
suggest that if Westat had conducted analyses that pooled the 3 and 4 year old samples, 
instead of only presenting estimates separately for 3 versus 4 year olds, almost all of the 
estimated Head Start impacts on the main cognitive outcomes of interest would be 
statistically significant.  But more importantly, as Cook and Ludwig [2006] argue, the 
expected value of a program’s benefits and costs may be a more relevant framework for 
making policy decisions than statistical significance, and the expected net value of Head 
Start is positive.  That is, odds are that Head Start passes a benefit-cost test for current 
cohorts of children. 
Finally, we close with some discussion about recent suggestions that have been 
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 made for increasing the cost-effectiveness of Head Start funding, including changing the 
program design, making the program more like some of the newer state pre-K programs 
in operation around the country, or even diverting some Head Start funding to these state 
programs.  There is in our view some uncertainty about both the short- and long-term 
benefits associated with these changes.  There are also downside risks, particularly if one 
recognizes that there is some opportunity cost associated with the resources required to 
implement some of the proposed changes to Head Start.  Given available evidence the 
expected net value of changing Head Start is ambiguous. 
II. THE BENEFITS OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 
The argument that we should judge the magnitude of Head Start’s impacts by how 
the dollar value of these benefits compare to the cost of the program will not seem like a 
new idea to economists and policy analysts.  Yet much of the public debate about the 
value of Head Start reflects some basic confusion on this point. 
One benchmark that has been used to gauge the size of Head Start’s impacts is 
relative to the scale of the social problem that is being addressed.  For example Besharov 
[2005] reviews the Westat report and argues “these small gains will not do much to close 
the achievement gap between poor children (particularly minority children) and the 
general population.  We should expect more of a program that serves almost 900,000 
children at a cost of $9 billion a year.” 
But the right standard of success for a public program is not the elimination of a 
social problem.  Consider, for example, that mortality rates from lung cancer in the U.S. 
in 2003 remain quite high – equal to 71.9 deaths per 100,000 people for males and 41.2 
deaths per 100,000 for females [Thun and Jemal, 2006, p. 346].  The fact that thousands 
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 of Americans continue to die each year from lung cancer does not mean that the large 
decline in tobacco smoking observed during the last half of the 20
th century should be 
considered a public health “failure,” particularly since diverting smokers from smoking 
appears to make them happier as well as healthier [Gruber and Koszegi, 2002; Gruber 
and Mullainathan, 2002]. 
Psychologists and education researchers often use the typology offered by Jacob 
Cohen [1977], who argues that an “effect size” (that is, program impact expressed as a 
share of a control group standard deviation) of .2 should be considered “small,” while 
effect sizes of .5 should be considered “medium” and those of .8 or more are “large.”  
Lipsey [1990] conducts a meta-analysis that draws on results from 6,700 studies in 
education and other related areas and finds that the empirical distribution of estimated 
effect sizes roughly corresponds to Cohen’s categorization [see also Bloom, 2005].  This 
is the convention adopted by Westat in their report on the short-term results of the recent 
randomized Head Start experiment.
4 
Yet any assessment of what a program accomplishes should take into account not 
just the program’s benefits but also its costs, which necessarily requires conversion of 
both into some common metric – that is, benefit-cost analysis.  A program that improved 
test scores by .8 standard deviations – “large” in Jacob Cohen’s [1977] scheme – but cost 
a total of $10 trillion per year would be difficult to support, since undertaking such an 
early childhood intervention would absorb the majority of the nation’s gross domestic 
product with very little left to house, clothe, feed and protect the nation’s child (and 
adult) population.  At the other extreme a program that generated impacts on the order of 
                                                 
4 The Westat report calls effect sizes below 0.2 standard deviations “small,” while those of 0.2 to 0.5 
standard deviations are “medium” and those over 0.5 are “large” [see Puma et al., 2005, p. ii, footnote 1]. 
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 .2 standard deviations but cost only a nickel per child per year would be difficult to 
oppose.  We should expect social programs to generate net benefits, not miraculous 
benefits.
5 
III. EVIDENCE ON HEAD START’S LONG-TERM IMPACTS 
While researchers have been studying Head Start for over 40 years, only in recent 
years have social scientists made real headway in identifying the causal impacts of the 
program on participating children.  There is now credible evidence on Head Start’s long-
term impacts that suggest the program passed a benefit-cost test over the first few 
decades of operation, but the program is changing over time and so these impacts might 
not be relevant to today’s Head Start.  Short-term impacts from the recent randomized 
experimental study of Head Start by themselves are not directly informative about 
whether the program’s long-term benefits justify program costs. 
Long-term effects of Head Start can obviously only be identified for those 
children who participated in the program a long time ago.  The main challenge in 
identifying the long-term effects of Head Start on earlier cohorts of children comes from 
the problem of trying to figure out what the outcomes of Head Start participants would 
have been had they not enrolled in the program.  Simply comparing the long-term 
outcomes of children who did participate with those who did not may provide misleading 
answers to the key causal question of interest.  If, for example, more disadvantaged 
families participate in Head Start, then simple comparisons of Head Start recipients to 
other children may understate the program’s effectiveness if researchers are unable to 
                                                 
5 For an excellent discussion of these points see Duncan and Magnuson [2006].  Harris [2007] presents a 
cost-effectiveness framework for judging program impacts and suggests that any intervention that generates 
increased test scores of .025 standard deviations per child per $1,000 spending should be considered 
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 adequately measure all aspects of family disadvantage.  The opposite bias may result if 
instead the more motivated and effective parents are the ones who are able to get their 
children into (or are selected by program administrators for) scarce Head Start slots. 
  Economists Eliana Garces, Duncan Thomas and Janet Currie [2002] evaluate 
Head Start by comparing the experiences of siblings who did and did not participate in 
the program.  The analytic sample consists of children who would have participated in 
Head Start in 1980 or earlier.  These sorts of within-family across-sibling comparisons 
help to eliminate the confounding influence of unmeasured family attributes that are 
common to all children within the home. 
The research design employed by Garces and colleagues represents a substantial 
improvement over previous research, although there necessarily remains some 
uncertainty about why some children within a family but not others participate in Head 
Start, and whether whatever is responsible for this within-family variation in program 
enrollment might also be relevant for children’s outcomes.  For example sibling 
comparisons might overstate (or understate) Head Start’s impacts if parents enroll their 
more (or less) able children to participate in the program. 
The Garces study might also understate Head Start’s impacts if there are positive 
spillover effects of participating in the program on other members of the family, since in 
this case the control group for the analysis (i.e. siblings who do not enroll in Head Start 
themselves) will be partially treated (i.e. benefit to some degree from having a sibling 
participate in Head Start).  In addition, their study relies on retrospective self reports of 
Head Start participation by people who have reached adulthood, which some people may 
                                                                                                                                                 
“large.”  The implication is that Head Start impacts of .175 standard deviations would be “large” under this 
framework, roughly consistent with our own benchmarks presented below. 
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 misremember or misreport.  If this measurement error is uncorrelated with respondents’ 
characteristics and potential outcomes then misreporting will cause their estimated Head 
Start impacts to be attenuated to some degree (that is, biased towards zero). 
  With these caveats in mind, Garces, Thomas and Currie report that non-Hispanic 
white children who were in Head Start are about 22 percentage points more likely to 
complete high school than their siblings who were in some other form of preschool, and 
about 19 percentage points more likely to attend some college.  These impact estimates 
are equal to around one-quarter and one-half of the “control mean.”  For African-
Americans the estimated Head Start impact on schooling attainment is small and not 
statistically significant, but for this group Head Start relative to other preschool 
experience is estimated to reduce the chances of being arrested and charged with a crime 
by around 12 percentage points, which, as with the schooling effect for whites, is a very 
large effect.
6   
  Ludwig and Miller [2007] use a different research design to overcome the 
selection bias problems in evaluating the long-term effects of Head Start and generate 
qualitatively similar findings for schooling attainment, although unlike Garces et al. they 
find evidence for impacts for blacks as well as whites.  Their design exploits a 
discontinuity in Head Start funding across counties generated by the way that the 
program was launched in 1965.  Specifically, the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) 
provided technical grant-writing assistance for Head Start funding to the 300 counties 
with the highest 1960 poverty rates in the country, but not to other counties.  The result is 
                                                 
6 The share of all children ever booked or charged with a crime in their data is 9.7% for the full sample and 
10% for the sibling sample.  These figures do not imply that Head Start achieves more than a 100% 
reduction in crime for program participants, since the right comparison for the estimated Head Start effect 
  - 9 - 
 that Head Start participation and funding rates are 50 to 100% higher in the counties with 
poverty rates that just barely put them into the group of the 300 poorest counties 
compared to those counties with poverty rates just below this threshold.  So long as other 
determinants of children’s outcomes vary smoothly by the 1960 poverty rate across these 
counties, any discontinuities (or “jumps”) in outcomes for those children who grew up in 
counties just above versus below the county poverty-rate cutoff for grant-writing 
assistance can be attributed to the effects of the extra Head Start funding. 
  Using this regression discontinuity design, Ludwig and Miller find that a 50-
100% increase in Head Start funding is associated with an increase in schooling 
attainment of about one-half year, and an increase in the likelihood of attending some 
college of about 15% of the control mean.  Importantly, the estimated effects of extra 
Head Start funding on educational attainment are found for both blacks and whites.  
These estimates are calculated for children who would have participated in Head Start 
during the 1960s or 1970s, and cannot be calculated for more recent cohorts of program 
participants since the Head Start funding discontinuity across counties at the heart of this 
research design seems to have dissipated over time. 
  Taken together, these impact estimates suggest that Head Start as it operated in 
the 1960s through 1980s generated benefits in excess of program costs, with a benefit-
cost ratio that might be at least as large as the 7-to-1 figure often cited for model early 
childhood programs such as Perry Preschool.  Currie [2001] notes that the short-term 
benefits of Head Start to parents in the form of high-quality child care together with 
medium-term benefits from reductions in special education placements and grade 
                                                                                                                                                 
on African-American participants is the average arrest rate for the siblings of these children, which does not 
seem to be reported in the study. 
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 retention might together offset between 40 and 60 percent of the program’s costs.   
Ludwig and Miller’s [2007] estimates imply that each extra dollar of Head Start funding 
in a county generates benefits from reductions in child mortality and increases in 
schooling attainment that easily outweigh the extra program spending.
7  In addition 
Frisvold [2007] provides some evidence that Head Start might reduce childhood obesity. 
  These findings run counter to the common view that only very intensive and 
expensive early childhood interventions are capable of generating long-term benefits.  
The origin of this conventional wisdom is itself not entirely clear, since there is no logical 
reason that lower-cost programs will necessarily have lower benefit-cost ratios compared 
to those from higher-cost programs.  The impacts of Head Start on children will depend 
on the difference in the developmental quality of the program versus the quality of the 
environments that low-income children would have experienced otherwise.  During its 
early years Head Start did not score well on commonly used indicators of early childhood 
program quality, such as teacher educational attainment.  This was based in part on Head 
Start’s origin as part of the Community Assistance Program of the War on Poverty with 
its emphasis on involvement of the poor in the design and implementation of new social 
programs [Vinovskis, 2005], including roles as classroom teachers and aides.  But for 
poor children in the 1960s through 1980s, the evaluation studies described above imply 
that the environments Head Start children would have experienced if not enrolled in the 
                                                 
7 Ludwig and Miller [2007] estimate the impact of an additional $400 per four year old in Head Start 
funding in a county.  The dollar value of the decline in child mortality is equal to around $120 per four year 
old in the county.  They also estimate an increase in schooling attainment of around one-half year per child.  
Card [1999] suggests an extra year of schooling increases earnings by 5 to 10 percent.  We conservatively 
assume the extra $400 in Head Start funding raises lifetime earnings by 2 percent per child, which Krueger 
[2003] shows is worth at least $15,000 in present value using a 3 present discount rate (even assuming no 
productivity growth over time).  The benefits would be even larger if we accounted for the fact that 
increased schooling also seems to reduce involvement with crime [Lochner and Morretti, 2004], and that 
the costs of crime to society are enormous – perhaps as much as $2 trillion per year [Ludwig, 2006]. 
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 program were less developmentally productive than Head Start. 
  One implication of this last point is that the effects of Head Start on poor children 
may be changing over time in ways that are difficult to predict, and so the long-term 
impacts of Head Start on previous cohorts of children may not represent the long-term 
effects of the program on today’s participants.  Over time the Head Start program has 
improved in quality, but arguably so has the alternative to Head Start for poor children 
since parent educational attainments and real incomes have increased since the 1960s and 
state-funded pre-school programs have been introduced.  It is not clear which 
environment is improving more rapidly in this horse race. 
  Fortunately the federal government has recently sponsored the first-ever 
randomized experimental evaluation of Head Start, the Head Start National Impact Study 
(HSNIS, hereafter “the randomized Head Start experiment”), with first-year results that 
are now available from Westat, the evaluation sub-contractor [Puma et al., 2005].  
Starting in 2002 nearly 4,700 three and four year old children whose parents applied for 
Head Start were randomly assigned to a Head Start treatment group or a control group 
that was not offered Head Start through the experiment, but could participate in other 
local preschool programs if slots were available.  The 84 Head Start centers participating 
in the experiment were selected to be representative of all programs in operation across 
the country that had waiting lists. 
The experiment seems to have been done well – randomization was implemented 
properly, and careful assessments were made of a wide variety of children’s cognitive 
and non-cognitive outcomes, and parents were also studied.  Response rates for both the 
child and parent assessments were usually around 10 percentage points lower for the 
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 control than treatment group.
8  Note that by randomly assigning income-eligible children 
to the treatment and control conditions, the Head Start experiment uncovers the effects of 
making Head Start available to all eligible children.  If, in practice, Head Start centers 
focus on enrolling the most disadvantaged of the eligible children that apply, and if the 
impacts of Head Start are more pronounced for more disadvantaged children, then the 
experimental impact estimates may under-state the effect of Head Start on the average 
program participant in the nation at large.  
  While the Head Start experiment is informative about a number of key policy 
questions about the program, in the absence of time travel we cannot directly measure the 
long-term impacts of Head Start for the children who only recently participated in the 
program.  As a result we are forced to rely on indirect evidence about what the short-term 
impact estimates from the recent Head Start experiment might imply about the program’s 
long-term effects.  This point is taken up in the next section. 
IV. SHORT-TERM BENCHMARKS FOR LONG-TERM SUCCESS 
  Head Start, as the program currently operates, spends about $7,000 per 
participating child.
9  How large would Head Start’s short-term impacts need to be, and in 
what outcome domains, for us to believe that the program’s long-term benefits justify the 
program expenditures?  We try to answer this question in two ways, first by examining 
the short-term impacts that have been found for studies of other early childhood 
interventions where there is also evidence for long-term benefits in excess of program 
costs, and then by trying to assess directly the dollar value of a standard deviation 
                                                 
8 Puma et al. [2005, p. 1-18] report that for the first data collection wave in Fall 2002, child response rates 
equaled 85% for the treatment group and 72% for the control group, and for parents equaled 89% and 81% 
for the treatment and control groups, respectively.  For the Spring 2003 follow-up response rates for 
children equaled 88% and 77% for the treatment and control groups, and 86% and 79% for parents. 
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 increase in early childhood test scores.  Both approaches are subject to some uncertainty 
given important limitations with the available evidence.  But with that qualification in 
mind, we believe there is a reasonable case to be made that positive impacts on 
achievement test scores on the order of .1 to .2 standard deviations (and perhaps even 
much smaller than that) would be large enough to generate long-term dollar-value 
benefits that would outweigh the program’s costs. 
A. Short-term Impacts of Yesteryear’s Head Start and Perry Preschool 
The findings from Garces et al. [2002] and Ludwig and Miller [2007] cited above 
suggest that Head Start as the program operated in the 1960s through 1980s seems to 
have generated long-term benefits that were larger than the program’s costs.   How large 
were the short-term impacts of Head Start on participating children, and in what outcome 
domains?  If the short-term impacts of today’s Head Start were about as large as the 
short-term impacts of yesterday’s program, and if the latter passes a benefit-cost test, 
there would be some reason to believe that the same might be true of the current program. 
Using the same sibling-difference design as in Garces et al. [2002], Currie and 
Thomas [1995] study children who would have been in Head Start in the 1980s or earlier 
and find that Head Start participation seems to increase scores on the PPVT vocabulary 
test by around .25 standard deviations in the short term for both white and African-
American children.  These impacts persist for whites, but fade out within three or four 
years for blacks.
10  Head Start’s impacts on PIAT math scores might be around half as 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 http://www.nhsa.org/download/advocacy/fact/HSBasics.pdf 
10 Currie and Thomas [1995, Table 6] use a sibling-difference research design and estimate a short-term 
effect of Head Start on PPVT test scores of nearly 7 percentile points in the national distribution for both 
blacks and whites.  The standard deviation of percentile ranking scores (i.e. a uniform distribution with 
values between 1 and 100) will be around 29 points, implying short-term effect sizes in the Currie and 
Thomas study of around one-quarter of a standard deviation. 
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 large and are not statistically significant [p. 345, fn 10]. 
11  Ludwig and Miller [2007] 
find that a 50-100% increase in Head Start funding does not lead to statistically 
significant increases in student achievement test scores in 8
th grade in either math o
reading, although they cannot rule out impacts smaller than around .2 standard 
deviations.  Nor do they have adequate sample sizes to examine impacts on test scores 
separately for blacks and whites.  Unfortunately not much is currently known about Head 










While there remains some debate about the relative importance of different ea
childhood cognitive or non-cognitive skills in predicting subsequent outcomes,
13 the 
literature as a whole is consistent with the idea that there are multiple pathways to long-
term success.  For example while Duncan et al. [2005] find that early math skills are t
strongest predictor of subsequent academic achievement, early reading and attention 
                                                 
11 Currie and Thomas [1995], p. 345, footnote 10, note the PIAT math results are not statistically 
significant, but that version of the study does not report the math point estimates themselves.  However 
earlier version of the study, Currie and Thomas [1993], reports results for PIAT math, PIAT reading and 
PPVT scores but not results interacted with age, so we cannot rec
an 
over short- versus long-term effects.  
n 
otional outcomes, notably aggressive behavior, do seem to contribute to 
that the 
d 
However the overall impacts for whites for PIAT math scores are about half as large as the PPVT results, 
and PIAT reading scores are about 15% of the PPVT impacts. 
12 Currie and Thomas [1995, Table 4] do find some evidence that Head Start might reduce grade retentio
for white children who participated in the program in the 1980s or earlier. 
13 For example Duncan et al. [2005] do not find much evidence that non-cognitive outcomes measured 
during early childhood (aside from attention skills) predict later test scores, although other correlational 
studies have found that socio-em
children’s achievement trajectories [Hinshaw, 1992; Jimerson, Egeland, and Teo, 1999; Miles and Stipek, 
2006; Tremblay et al., 1992]. 
14 These correlational data of course have important limitations in illuminating the causal relationships of 
early childhood outcomes with later outcomes.  For example suppose that most parents read to their 
children, but what really distinguishes the most scholastically motivated parents from their peers is 
former try to impact math skills to their children even during the early childhood period.  In this case the 
relatively strong correlation between early math and later scores could simply be a stand-in for the 
influence of parent motivation to help their children learn, and so an increase in early math skills induce
by some intervention would yield longer-term impacts that are smaller than Duncan et al.’s correlations 
would suggest.  Alternatively one can also imagine that children with early childhood socio-emotional 
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 The fact that early childhood programs like Head Start achieve long-term behavioral 
impacts despite “fade out” of initial achievement test score gains suggests that lasting 
program impacts on non-cognitive skills might be the key drivers of long-term program 
impacts on outcomes such as school completion or employment [see for example 
Carniero and Heckman, 2003].  But it is possible that short-term boosts in academic skills 
are a key mechanism for improving non-cognitive skills such as motivation and 
persistence by for instance increasing children’s confidence in school [Barnett, Young 
and Schweinhart, 1998].  If we interpret short-term test scores as a proxy for the bundle 
of early skills that promote long term outcomes, then the previous research on earlier 
Head Start cohorts suggests that short-term impacts of around .25 standard deviations for 
vocabulary and perhaps .1 for math might be large enough to generate long-term benefits 
in excess of program costs. 
  We can also look at the short- versus long-term impacts of the widely-cited Perry 
Preschool program, which provided poor 3 and 4 year old children with two years of 
services at a total per-child cost of about twice that of Head Start.
15  At the end of the 
second year of services, Perry had increased PPVT vocabulary scores by around .91 
standard deviations and scores on a test of nonverbal intellectual performance (the Leiter 
International Performance test) by around .77 standard deviations [Schweinhart et al., 
2005, p. 61].  By age 9, the impact on vocabulary scores had faded out entirely, while 
around half of the original impact on nonverbal performance had dissipated.  By age 14 
impacts on reading and math scores are just over .3 standard deviations.  Despite this 
                                                                                                                                                 
problems receive a variety of compensatory resources from their parents and schools to offset these early 
developmental challenges.  In this case any intervention that improved children’s early socio-emotional 
skills – holding all else constant – might have larger impacts than the Duncan et al. correlations would 
imply. 
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 partial fade-out of test score impacts, Perry Preschool shows large long-term impacts on 
schooling, crime and other outcomes measured through age 40 [Schweinhart et al., 2005]
The dollar value of Perry Preschool’s long-term benefits (in present dollars) range from 
nearly $100,000 calculated using a 7 percent discount 
.  








t to pass a benefit-cost test. 
B. The
                                                                                                                                                
 discount rate [Belfield et al., 2006, p. 180-1]. 
Suppose that short-term test score impacts are proportional to the dollar valu
long-term program benefits.  In this case, even if we used a conservative 7 percent 
discount rate Head Start’s short-term impacts would need to be at most around 7 perc
as large ($7,000 / $100,000) as those of Perry Preschool (that is, around .08 and .05 
standard deviations for vocabulary and nonverbal performance, respectively) to generate 
benefits that are large enough to outweigh Head Start’s costs of around $7,000 per child.  
If we use a 3 percent discount rate instead, the necessary shor
rder of .03 and .02 standard deviations, respectively. 
Of course it might be possible that long-term gains are not strictly proportional
short-term impacts.  For example, it could be the case that some minimum short-term 
impact is necessary in order to generate lasting cognitive or non-cognitive benefits.  It 
could also be the case that the behavioral consequences of achievement impacts on the 
low-IQ sample of Michigan children in Perry Preschool are different from those arisin
from similar-sized impacts on a more representative Head Start population.  But, at a 
minimum, the Perry Preschool data raise the possibility that “small” short-term impacts 
might be sufficient for a program with the costs of Head Star
 Value of Increasing Early Childhood Test Scores 
 
15 Currie [2001] cites Perry costs of $12,884 per child in 1999 dollars. 
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 Another way to think about how large Head Start’s short-term impacts would 
need to be in order for the program to pass a benefit-cost test is to measure directly th
value of a 1 standard deviation increase in early childhood test scores.  Because few 
studies have followed people from early childhood all the way through adulthood, this
exercise is necessarily subject to some uncertainty.  But the evidence that is available 








s necessary to 
generate $7,000 in benefits could be as little as .04 standard deviations. 
                                                
 pass a benefit-cost test, consistent with the evidence from the previous section. 
The British National Child Development Study (NCDS) is one of the few datase
available for this purpose, and includes achievement test scores measured at age 7 and 
earnings measured at age 33 for a sample of people born in the U.K. in 1958.  Krueger 
[2003] argues that analyses of these data suggest that an increase in early childhood tes
scores in either reading or math of 1 standard deviation might plausibly be associated 
with higher lifetime earnings of about 8 percent.
16  If Krueger’s argument is correct, th
the short-term impacts on reading or math that would be needed to generate $7,000 in 
benefits from increased future earnings would be on the order of around .07 (using a 3 
percent discount rate and assuming no productivity growth).
17  If we assume productivit
growth of 2 percent, then the short-term impact on reading or math score
 
16 Krueger [2003] notes that Currie and Thomas’ [1999] analyses of these data imply that a 1 standard 
deviation increase in test scores increases lifetime earnings by around 8 percent.  This impact is smaller 
than what has been estimated for a 1 standard deviation increase in test scores measured during adolescence 
for more recent US samples, which typically suggest earnings gains of around 20 percent.  The difference is 
presumably due as Krueger notes to some combination of differences in the time period studied, the US vs 
UK labor markets, the fact that Currie and Thomas control for both reading and math scores simultaneously 
while most US studies examine one type of test score at a time in their effects on earnings. 
17 Krueger [2003] reports increased lifetime earnings from a .2 standard deviation increase in test scores 
using a 3 percent discount rate and assuming no productivity growth of $15,174 in 1998 dollars, equal to 
around $18,800 in current dollars.  So the effect size required to generate $7,000 in benefits is equal to 
($7,000 / $18,800)*.2 = .37*.2 = .07. 
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 One possible objection is that we are trying to use non-experimental correlations 
between early test scores and adult earnings to extrapolate to earnings gains from short-
term experimental impacts, which fade over time.  But as noted above there is fade out in 
non-experimental achievement test advantage as well – that is, test scores measured in 
early childhood and adolescence are correlated, but imperfectly.
18  Alternatively the 
correlation between early childhood cognitive test scores and subsequent earnings might 
be different from the earnings impacts associated with a program-induced change in 
cognitive test scores.  One reason is that the correlation between achievement test scores 
and earnings observed in population data may reflect, in part, the association of 
achievement test scores and IQ scores, for which early childhood programs have had a 
harder time generating lasting impacts [see for example Schweinhart et al., 2005]. 
On the other hand, the calculations presented above assume that the only benefit 
from increased early test scores is higher adult earnings.  But anything that increases 
early childhood test scores and subsequently future earnings could affect other outcomes 
as well.  Crime is one of the most important of these other outcomes, given that the social 
costs of crime might be on the order of $2 trillion per year [Ludwig, 2006].  In the Perry 
Preschool experiment, around two-thirds of the total dollar-value of the program’s 
benefits came from crime reductions [Belfield et al., 2006]. 
There is to date no entirely satisfactory way of determining how early test score 
impacts relate to longer life outcomes.  But the two different approaches used here both 
suggest that short-term impacts that would be considered very small by the usual 
standards of education research – on the order of .05 standard deviations or less – could 
                                                 
18 Jencks and Phillips [1998, p. 28] think a plausible estimate is that the correlation between 1
st and 12
th 
grade test scores is around .52.  The implication is that a child starting at the 16
th percentile of the test score 
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 potentially generate long-term benefits that would at least equal Head Start’s cost per 
participant (around $7,000).  Given the uncertainties with these calculations, a more 
conservative approach would be to require that Head Start improve short-term test scores 
by .1 to .2 standard deviations in order to believe that the program generates long-term 
benefits that are large enough to justify the costs. 
V. HOW LARGE ARE HEAD START’S CURRENT SHORT-TERM IMPACTS? 
  The best available evidence on current Head Start’s impacts on children comes 
from the Head State National Impact Study carried out by Westat for the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, which we will refer to for convenience as 
“the randomized Head Start experiment.”  The results of this experiment have been 
characterized as “disappointingly small” [Besharov, 2005, p. 1], although much of the 
public discussion of these findings seems to confuse the intent to treat effects emphasized 
in Westat’s report on the experimental results with the effects of Head Start participation 
per se (that is, the effects of treatment on the treated.  The short-term impacts of Head 
Start participation are usually equal to or greater than the .1 or .2 standard deviation 
benchmark that is necessary for Head Start to pass a benefit-cost test.  While many of the 
point estimates that Westat calculates separately for 3 and 4 year old program participants 
are not statistically significant, our calculations suggest that pooling data for 3 and 4 year 
olds leads impact estimates for almost all of the main cognitive outcome measures 
emphasized in the Westat report’s Executive Summary to be statistically significant.  But 
more importantly the expected value of the program is positive. 
A. Intent-to-Treat Effects vs. the Effects of Head Start Participation 
One common source of confusion about the recent randomized Head Start 
                                                                                                                                                 
distribution in first grade will on average be at the 27
th percentile of the distribution in 12
th grade. 
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 experiment stems from the fact that the main results, particularly those in the executive 
summary to the several-hundred-page report, are not intended to reflect the effects of 
actual Head Start participation.  The executive summary and most of the tables in the 
body of the report itself focus on the causal effects of offering children the chance to 
participate in Head Start by assigning them to the Head Start experimental group – that is, 
the intent to treat impact.  These results are often discussed as if they represent the effects 
of Head Start participation.  They do not. 
  In practice not everyone who is offered the chance to participate in Head Start 
will actually enroll – parents, for example, might decide that Head Start will not meet 
their own or their children’s needs or better alternative opportunities might present 
themselves.  If some people assigned to the experimental treatment group do not 
participate in the program, and, relatedly, if some people assigned to the control group 
enroll in Head Start on their own, then the effects of Head Start participation (the effect 
of treatment on the treated) can be different – sometimes quite different – from the effects 
of treatment-group assignment. 
The problems of drawing inferences about Head Start participation from the 
effects of treatment-group assignment can be easily seen by imagining an example in 
which everyone assigned to the treatment group participates in Head Start ... but because 
of their own efforts, so does everyone in the control group.  If the average quality of the 
Head Start programs experienced by children in the treatment and control groups were 
the same, the effects of treatment group assignment (the intent-to-treat estimate) would 
be equal to exactly zero.  It would obviously be incorrect to infer from these estimates 
that Head Start does nothing to improve the life chances of participating children.  The 
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 central point is that if Head Start participation rates are less than 100% among children 
assigned to the treatment group or greater than 0% among those in the control group, or 
both, then the effects of actual Head Start enrollment (the effect of treatment on the 
treated) will be larger than the estimated effect of being assigned to the treatment group 
(the intent-to-treat effect). 
  In the Head Start experimental data we see that around 86% of 4 year olds 
assigned to the experimental treatment group enrolled in Head Start, while 18% of 4 year 
olds assigned to the control group wound up in Head Start on their own [p. 3-7, Puma et 
al., 2005].
19  The body of the report does mention that the intent-to-treat estimates will 
understate the effects of actually participating in Head Start.  But the report’s description 
of how it tries to convert the intent-to-treat estimates into something like an estimate for 
the effect of Head Start participation is confusing and the actual approach they employ 
might be misleading.  In any case these results are relegated to one of the appendices and 
perhaps as a result seem to have been largely ignored in public discussions compared to 
the intent-to-treat estimates included in the Executive Summary.
20  
More than 20 years ago, Howard Bloom [1984] proposed a method for translating 
intent-to-treat effects into estimates for the effects of treatment on the treated.  He noted 
that under some conditions we can learn about the effects of treatment participation – in 
this case, Head Start enrollment – by scaling differences in the treatment and control 
                                                 
19 The figures for 3 year olds assigned to the treatment and control groups equal 89% and 21%, 
respectively. 
20 The report describes the Bloom [1984] procedure for handling “no shows” in the treatment group, but 
does not use this procedure to handle the problem of control group members who wind up in Head Start on 
their own [p. 4-29, 4-35].  Instead the report seems to drop control group families who wind up in Head 
Start on their own and then re-weight the remaining control group members; see pp. 4-35,6.  The report 
mentions the Bloom [1984] approach we use to calculate TOT impacts accounting for compliance rates in 
both the treatment and control groups on p. 4-36 but notes only that Westat will explore how findings from 
this procedure compare to their default procedure in future reports. 
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 groups in average outcomes by the difference in the treatment and control groups in 
treatment participation rates.  This procedure assumes random assignment is in fact 
random, and that treatment group assignment has no effect on children who do not 
participate in Head Start.
21  In addition, the Bloom procedure assumes that everyone who 
would participate in Head Start if assigned to the control group would also participate if 
they had been assigned to the treatment group instead.  It further assumes that the average 
quality of the Head Start programs attended by children assigned to the treatment versus 
control groups is comparable.  This latter assumption may be more problematic, but even 
fairly large differences in Head Start program quality between Head Start enrollees in the 
treatment and control group would impart relatively modest bias to the estimates derived 
from Bloom’s procedure. 
Why focus on the effects of actually participating in Head Start rather than the 
intent-to-treat estimates?  One answer is that the effect sizes for the Head Start 
experiment’s intent-to-treat estimates are often compared to estimates from Perry 
Preschool, Carolina Abedarian and the results of more recent evaluations of universal 
state pre-K programs, all of which estimate the effects of actually participating in these 
other programs.  This sort of apples (TOT) -to- oranges (ITT) comparison will obviously 
understate the relative effectiveness of Head Start. 
A more important reason for focusing on estimates for the effects of actually 
participating in Head Start (treatment on the treated) is to avoid confusion in conducting a 
benefit-cost analysis of Head Start.  In public discussions about Head Start’s costs, the 
                                                 
21 Stated differently, the latent propensity to participate in Head Start if assigned to the treatment group is 
assumed to be equivalent for children who were, in fact, assigned to the treatment and control groups.  This 
should be true if random assignment was in fact random, since the propensity to participate in Head Start – 
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 focus is always on the costs per actual enrollee.  The benefit measure that should be 
compared with this cost is then the dollar value of the benefits per enrollee – that is, the 
dollar-value of the gains from actually participating in Head Start. 
It is possible that Westat’s report on the Head Start experiment focuses more on 
intent-to-treat impacts than on the effects of treatment on the treated because either 
Westat or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services might be uncomfortable 
with presenting treatment-on-the-treated estimates that do require imposing some 
additional assumptions on the data beyond those necessary to calculate the intent-to-treat 
effects.  Our own view is that even if some of the assumptions for calculating the 
treatment-on-the-treated impacts are not strictly true (for example if there is some 
difference in program quality for children enrolled in Head Start in the experiment’s 
treatment versus control groups), the treatment-on-the-treated estimates still provide more 
useful approximations for the effects of actually enrolling in Head Start, and help avoid 
confusion along the lines described above. 
Readers who are uncomfortable with the assumptions required for the treatment-
on-the-treated calculations can conduct their own benefit-cost analysis using the intent-
to-treat impact estimates, but must then be careful to adjust the cost side of the equation 
appropriately.  If the difference in Head Start enrollment rates between the Head Start 
experiment’s treatment and control groups equals (86% - 18%) = 68%, then the right 
“cost” for comparison to the intent-to-treat “benefit” would equal the average Head Start 
cost per child assigned to the HSNIS treatment group minus the average Head Start cost 
                                                                                                                                                 
like all other baseline characteristics – will be equally distributed between treatment and control groups 
(subject to sampling error). 
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 per child assigned to the control group.  This cost figure equals 68% * $7,000 = $4,760.
22   
B. Head Start’s Short-Term Impacts 
In Table 1 we show the ITT impacts on each of the cognitive outcome domains 
reported in the Executive Summary of Westat’s report for the first-year findings of the 
Head Start experiment [Puma et al., 2005].  While the published Westat report did not 
show standard errors for impact estimates, Ronna Cook at Westat has very generously 
made these available to us.  In Table 1 we present point estimates and standard errors that 
are converted into effect size terms (i.e. expressed as a share of the control group 
standard deviation for that outcome measure).
23 
Table 1 also presents our own estimates for the effects of actually participating in 
Head Start (the effects of treatment on the treated) derived using Bloom’s approach 
together with information about Head Start enrollment rates in the experiment’s treatment 
and control groups.  In the Head Start experiment, the difference in Head Start 
participation rates between the treatment and control groups is around 68 percentage 
points and so, using the Bloom procedure, we would estimate that the effects of Head 
Start enrollment on children are about 1.5 times as large as the intent-to-treat effects that 
are commonly misinterpreted to represent the effects of Head Start participation.  These 
                                                 
22 It is easy to see that since both the costs and benefits of the ITT calculation are proportional to the TOT 
calculations by the treatment-control difference in Head Start enrollment rates, evidence for benefits in 
excess of costs for the ITT approach implies the same must be true with the TOT approach and vice versa.  
The important thing is to avoid comparing the dollar value of the ITT impact estimates with the costs per 
Head Start enrollee. 
23 In the body of the report Westat presents a series of different impact estimates for each outcome domain, 
including those that do not adjust for baseline characteristics, those that adjust for baseline socio-
demographic characteristics only, and those that also adjust for fall outcome measures in looking at spring 
test scores.  Because the fall outcome measures are collected mostly by mid-November (collected over the 
period October to December), in principle controlling for these measures could understate Head Start’s 
impacts due to program effects that arise during the early parts of the academic year.  Table 1 presents 
Westat’s own preferred regression-adjusted point estimates and standard errors, based on Westat’s 
examination of whether there is any evidence of program gains between the beginning of the school year 
and when the fall outcome measures are collected. 
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 results are best interpreted as providing a range within which the “true” effects of Head 
Start likely fall.  If the average Head Start program quality is somewhat higher for the 
treatment than control groups then our Bloom-style estimates for the effects of treatment 
on the treated might be biased upward somewhat. 
Note also that our estimates for the effects of Head Start participation also assume 
that the 10 percentage point difference in response rates between the Head Start 
experiment treatment and control groups [Puma et al. 2005, p. 1-18] do not impart any 
bias to the basic intent-to-treat estimates.  Of course if there is selective sample attrition 
that biases the basic intent-to-treat estimates, this would represent a more fundamental 
problem with the Head Start experiment that cannot be solved by focusing on the intent-
to-treat effects rather than the effects of treatment on the treated. 
  Table 1 shows that at least for cognitive skills all of the Head Start impact 
estimates point in the direction consistent with beneficial program impacts, although 
many of these point estimates are not statistically significant and in general the point 
estimates are larger (both absolutely and in relation to their standard errors) for 3 year 
olds than 4 year olds.  For rhetorical convenience we focus on the effects of treatment on 
the treated estimates because we believe they are likely to be much closer approximations 
of the true effect of Head Start participation per se than are the intent-to-treat estimates.  
Nevertheless, it should be understood that the true impact is probably somewhere in 
between the ITT and TOT estimates.   
For vocabulary, pre-reading and pre-writing skills Head Start’s effects (the effects 
of treatment on the treated) range from .15 to .35 standard deviations, while for 4 year 
olds the impacts are one-third to one-half as large as for 3 year olds on the PPVT and 
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 smaller for pre-reading and pre-writing.  Parent-reported literacy skills show much more 
pronounced Head Start impacts, equal to .5 and .4 standard deviations for 3 and 4 year 
olds, respectively.  There are reasons to believe that the results from direct student 
assessments in this outcome domain may be more reliable than those derived from parent 
reports.
24 
  Given the findings by Greg Duncan and his colleagues that early math scores are 
the strongest predictor of subsequent achievement test scores, one particular concern with 
the Head Start experiment results has been that the impact estimates on early math scores 
(measured by the Woodcock-Johnson applied problems test) are not statistically 
significant.  Head Start’s impact on this test equals .18 and .15 standard deviations for 3 
and 4 year olds, respectively.  Duncan’s study also finds that attention skills are important 
in predicting future test scores.  The closest measure to this in the HSNIS is a variable for 
hyperactive behavior, where we see a Head Start impact of -.26 standard deviations for 3 
year olds but a zero point estimate for 4 year olds. 
  A different concern that has been raised about these impact estimates comes from 
the ability of the available assessments to detect reliable impacts of this size in young 
children.  One criterion we have for cognitive or non-cognitive assessments is that they 
are reliable – that is, they generate similar results when applied on different occasions.  A 
standard concern is that assessments of very young children may not be very reliable, for 
reasons that will be obvious to anyone who has ever been the parent of a young child 
(short attention span, variability in temperament and willingness to cooperate, and so on).  
                                                 
24 Rock and Stenner [2005, p. 21] note that for the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study of the 
Kindergarten Class of 1998-99 (ECLS-K) parent reports of children’s social competence and skills have 
not proven reliable, with “the main concern [being] that parents often have little basis for determining 
whether behavior is age appropriate.”  Analogous concerns could in principle apply to parent reports about 
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 Reliability scores for achievement tests administered to adolescents are usually on the 
order of .8 to .9 [see for example Murnane et al., 1995].  Westat shared with us the 
reliability scores for the cognitive outcomes used in the Head Start experiment and these 
are typically on the same order but sometimes a bit lower.  They are also lower for 
measures of non-cognitive skills compared to cognitive outcomes [see also Rock and 
Stenner, 2005].
25 
  If the limitations of available assessments simply introduce random noise into 
children’s outcome scores, then the dependent variables in the Head Start experimental 
analysis will suffer from classical measurement error and the result would simply be less 
precise estimation of Head Start impacts (i.e., larger standard errors).  This concern 
would provide a candidate explanation for why so many of the Head Start experimental 
impact estimates are not statistically significant, but does not pose a threat for 
interpretation of those impact estimates that are statistically significant. 
C. Statistically Insignificant Impact Estimates 
For policy purposes what we want to know is whether Head Start passes a benefit-
cost test.  Most of the estimates for the effects of Head Start participation presented in 
Table 1 are above the .1 to .2 standard deviation threshold we think necessary for Head 
Start to pass a benefit-cost test.  But many of these point estimates are not statistically 
significant.  So what should policy makers conclude about the program? 
The Head Start experiment enrolled nearly 4,700 children, which is large by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
their children’s literacy skills. 
25 The reliabilities of the different cognitive and non-cognitive tests used in the Head Start experiment are 
as follows (3 year old figure shown first in parentheses, followed by figure for 4 year olds; only reliabilities 
for pooled 3 and 4 year old samples are available for the non-cognitive outcomes): WJ Word (.87, .9); 
Letter naming (.96, 97); McCarthy Drawing Score (.65, .73); WJ Spelling (.74, .78); PPVT (.66, .8); Color 
naming (.94, .94); WJ Oral Comprehension (.8, .88); WJ Applied Problems (.9, .91); Social skills and 
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 standards of many social program evaluations but tiny compared to many randomized 
clinical trials in medicine, and in any case means that the standard errors around the 
resulting point estimates are subject to some non-trivial sampling uncertainty.  This 
uncertainty is compounded by the fact that Westat’s report on the Head Start experiment 
further splits the sample by showing results separately for 3 and 4 year olds, particularly 
in the main table of results shown in the executive summary.  While this splitting of the 
analytic sample makes sense for developmental reasons (program impacts may differ by 
age; see for example Knudsen et al. [2006]), it further reduces statistical power. 
Table 1 illustrates the basic issue confronting policymakers.  Recall that the 
estimates presented by Greg Duncan and his colleagues [2005] suggest that early math 
scores might be the strongest predictors of children’s later cognitive outcomes.  Section 
III above suggests that short-term impacts of .1 to .2 might be large enough for Head 
Start to pass a benefit-cost test.  The effects of Head Start participation implied by the 
Head Start experimental data for early math scores for 3 and 4 year olds equal .18 and .15 
standard deviations, respectively – neither of which is statistically significant!   
One alternative analytic approach would have been to pool the 3 and 4 year old 
samples in the Head Start experiment.  While the Westat report does not present these 
analyses, with data on the separate impact estimates, sample sizes and standard deviations 
for the 3 and 4 year old samples we can approximate what the impact estimates and 
standard errors would be if Westat had pooled the two age groups together for analysis.  
Our calculations will only allow us to calculate standard errors that do not benefit from 
the improved precision afforded by adjusting for baseline covariates, and so our pooled 
                                                                                                                                                 
approaches to learning (.62); Social competencies (.58); Total problem behavior (.74); Hyperactive 
behavior (.58); Aggressive behavior (.6); and Withdrawn behavior (.45). 
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 standard errors are if anything conservative.  Our calculations suggest that for a pooled 
sample of 3 and 4 year olds the Head Start impact estimate would be statistically 
significant for every cognitive outcome domain shown in Table 1 except oral 
comprehension. 
Perhaps more importantly, while scientific convention is to ignore estimates that 
are not statistically significant at the usual 95 percent cutoff (that is, assume they are 
zero), we believe that a more productive way to proceed for policy purposes is to focus 
on the expected value of the program benefits and costs, as suggested by Cook and 
Ludwig [2006].  The reason is that following the course of action associated with the null 
hypothesis of no statistically significant impact is itself a policy decision that winds up 
being overly privileged if we only follow through on point estimates that meet the usual 
standard for statistical significance. 
To see the difference, we revisit the hypothetical program we introduced in 
Section II above, which we assume increases children’s test scores by .2 standard 
deviations at a cost of just a nickel per child.  Suppose that a randomized experimental 
evaluation of this intervention yielded a point estimate for a treatment effect of .2 
standard deviations, but that the standard error was somewhat large and so the p-value for 
this estimate was equal to .8.  While no referee worth her salt would endorse a scientific 
manuscript that claimed that this intervention “works,” at the same time she would surely 
wish that her own child’s school district jumped at the chance to adopt this program. 
  This sort of expected value framework suggests that Head Start as it currently 
operates is likely to pass a benefit-cost test.  There are good reasons to believe that short-
term impacts on reading and math scores on the order of .1 to .2 standard deviations, and 
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 perhaps much smaller than that, would be large enough for Head Start to generate 
benefits in excess of costs.  Table 1 shows that most of the point estimates for Head 
Start’s effects on cognitive skills for both 3 and 4 year olds are of about this magnitude, 
even when these estimates are not statistically significant for the two samples. 
VI. HEAD START ALTERNATIVES 
  The fact that the current incarnation of Head Start seems to pass a benefit-cost test 
does not rule out the possibility that there could be even more cost-effective ways of 
deploying Head Start resources.  One possibility that has figured prominently in debates 
about Head Start is to make the program more academically oriented, rather than focused 
on providing a broad range of academic, health, nutrition, and social services to 
disadvantaged children.  The assumption is that focusing a greater share of children’s 
time in the program on academic instruction will generate stronger achievement 
outcomes.  Some observers point to larger impact estimates that have been reported from 
recent studies of new universal state pre-K programs, which are more narrowly focused 
on instructional activities.  They suggest that we should make Head Start operate more 
like those programs, particularly with respect to the state pre-K requirements that 
teachers have four-year college degrees, or even divert funding from Head Start to the 
state programs.  These proposals hold some intuitive appeal.  However the benefits 
associated with these changes in practice are uncertain, plus there is some downside risk, 
and so the expected value of these proposed changes to Head Start remain unclear at the 
present time. 
  The recent Head Start experimental evaluation provides rigorous information 
about the short-term impacts of Head Start as it operated since the program’s inception, 
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 as a comprehensive program focused on nutrition, physical and mental health, parenting 
and social services as well as education.  The studies of Currie and Thomas [1995], 
Garces, Thomas and Currie [2002], and Ludwig and Miller [2007] also provide what is to 
us persuasive evidence for the long-term impacts of Head Start as the program was 
originally designed.  To date there is no evaluation evidence available about what would 
be achieved for current recipients by a new version of Head Start that was more 
academically oriented. 
  Several recent studies of universal state pre-K programs suggest impressively 
large impact estimates.  Gormley et al. [2005] evaluate the effects of Tulsa, Okahoma’s 
pre-K program and report TOT estimates equal to .8 standard deviations for the 
Woodcock-Johnson-Revised (WJ-R) letter-word identification test (more than twice as 
large as those found in the recent Head Start experiment), with effect sizes of .65 for the 
WJ-R spelling test (almost three times as large as those reported for four year olds in the 
Head Start experiment) and of .38 for the WJ-R applied problems math test (more than 
twice as large as for four year olds in the Head Start experiment), all of which are 
statistically significant.  Barnett et al. [2005] examine pre-K programs in five separate 
states and report effect sizes of .26 for the PPVT vocabulary test and .28 for the WJ-R 
applied problems test, both of which are statistically significant. 
  What explains the difference in impact estimates between these state pre-K 
programs and Head Start?  One candidate explanation is that the pre-K programs that 
have been evaluated to date require all teachers to hold four-year college degrees, while 
Head Start does not impose that requirement.  Teachers in these state pre-K programs 
will presumably also have higher salaries than Head Start teachers, given the difference 
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 in average educational attainment.  But most of the state pre-K programs report average 
per-student costs below those of Head Start,
26 perhaps because they employ higher class 
sizes (for example 10:1 in the Tulsa program compared with around 6 or 7 to 1 in Head 
Start) or potentially because of differences in how cost estimates for the two types of 
programs account for fixed costs.  
  An alternative explanation comes from the fact that the state pre-K programs that 
have been recently evaluated are universal while Head Start is targeted mostly at very 
low-income children.  If there are positive spillover effects from attending school with 
more affluent or higher-achieving children then “peer effects” could account for part of 
the difference in impacts between pre-K and Head Start. 
  A third candidate explanation for the difference in impact estimates for state 
universal pre-K programs and Head Start is the possibility of bias within the recent 
evaluations of state pre-K programs.  While these recent state pre-K studies are major 
improvements over anything that has been done to examine such programs in the past, 
they are nonetheless all derived using a research design that may be susceptible to bias of 
unknown sign and magnitude.  Specifically, these recent studies all use a regression 
discontinuity design that compares fall semester tests for kindergarten children who 
participated in pre-K the previous year and have birthdates close to the cutoff for having 
enrolled last year with fall tests of children who are just starting pre-K by virtue of having 
birthdates that just barely excluded them from participating the previous year.  One 
identifying assumption here is that the selection process of children into pre-K is 
“smooth” around the birthday enrollment cutoff, but this need not be the case since there 
                                                 
26 For example Gormley and Gayer [2005] report per-pupil costs for 2005 for Tulsa pre-K of $3,500 to 
$6,000 for the full-day version of the program, which is less than the $7,000 figure for Head Start that 
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 is a discrete change at the birthday threshold in terms of the choice set that families face 
in making this decision.   
For instance, suppose that among the children whose birthdays just barely 
excluded them from enrolling in pre-K during the previous year, those with the most 
motivated parents wound up being sent the previous year to private programs that are 
analogous to the public pre-K program and are then enrolled in private kindergarten 
programs in the fall semester that the pre-K study outcome measures are collected.  This 
type of selection would reduce the share of more motivated parents among the control 
group in the pre-K studies and lead them to overstate the benefits of pre-K participation. 
Moreover the pre-K evaluations that have been done to date focus on those states 
that are leaders in this area.  The experiences of pre-K programs in these states may or 
may not reflect the average pre-K effect we would observe if we made a wholesale shift 
of resources from Head Start to pre-K.   
The critical policy question is whether such a shift would create the possibility of 
greater benefits or of harm.  Presently, this is an unanswerable question.  The recent Head 
Start experimental evaluation, as well as the on-going evaluation of Early Head Start, 
have pointed in the direction of beneficial impacts on both cognitive and non-cognitive 
outcome domains (e.g., social, emotional, and health outcomes), even if not all of the 
impact estimates are statistically significant.  Previous studies have also found beneficial 
Head Start impacts on health outcomes and on crime reduction [Garces et al., 2002; 
Ludwig and Miller, 2007; Frisvold, 2007].  Changing Head Start’s design to make the 
program more academic, or to look more like existing universal state pre-K programs, or 
even to shift Head Start funding to state programs that sometimes rely on mixed delivery 
                                                                                                                                                 
represents an average of half- and full-day students. 
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 systems could potentially generate improved academic outcomes, but the possible 
impacts on these other important domains of development remain unknown.  While 
evaluations of high-quality, intensive early childhood interventions have found positive 
short- and long-term impacts on social-emotional outcomes, studies focusing on 
community-based child care have found some unfavorable social outcomes with greater 
participation especially in center-based care [Magnuson, Ruhm and Waldfogel, 2004; 
Zaslow, 2006].  Studies of state-funded universal pre-K programs have not yet reported 
findings for social-emotional outcomes.  As a result policy actions that would shift or 
withdraw resources from Head Start are risky. 
  It is important to recognize that a different kind of risk from changing Head Start 
comes from the fact that the resources required to implement some of the proposed 
changes have some opportunity cost, since the funding in question could in principle have 
been devoted to other uses, including other social programs.  For instance, an 
increasingly common proposal is to require Head Start teachers to hold 4 year college 
degrees.  This change would require higher salaries to recruit and retain more highly-
educated teachers, which would require either more spending for the Head Start program 
as a whole or else reductions in other parts of the Head Start budget.  Even knowing that 
requiring BA-level teachers leads to improved student outcomes would not be sufficient 
to endorse this policy from an economist’s perspective.  We would want to know how 
these gains compare to what could be achieved from devoting those extra resources to 
other uses such as further reducing class sizes in Head Start,
27 expanding the program’s 
coverage to more eligible low-income children, or improving pre-natal health and 
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 outreach services to low-income women.  Given these downside risks, it is possible to 
determine whether alternative uses of Head Start funding that have been proposed have 
positive or negative expected value. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
  There is credible evidence that Head Start generates long-term benefits and passes 
a benefit-cost test, at least for children who participated during the first few decades of 
the program.  For the current version of Head Start, we have rigorous evidence of short-
term impacts from a recent experimental evaluation but no direct data on long-term 
effects since experimental subjects have just recently finished participating in the 
program.  However there are reasons to believe that with a cost of $7,000 per child Head 
Start does not need to yield very large short-term test score impacts in order to pass a 
benefit-cost test.  Effect sizes of .1 or .2 might be enough, and impacts even smaller than 
this, perhaps much smaller, might be sufficient.  The estimated effects of Head Start 
enrollment on children – the effects of treatment on the treated – implied by the recent 
experimental study of the program typically exceed this threshold.  Many point estimates 
are not statistically significant when the results are presented separately for 3 and 4 year 
old participants, but the expected value of the program is still positive. 
  We certainly do not mean to claim that Head Start is a perfect program that 
cannot be improved.  It is possible that modifying the program in some of the ways that 
have been discussed in recent years, such as increasing the program’s academic focus to 
better target those skills that predict later literacy [Zaslow, 2006], or requiring teachers to 
hold a four-year college degree, could make the program more effective or even more 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 Currie and Neidell [forthcoming] suggest that redirecting resources to increase teacher qualifications and 
salaries within the existing Head Start budget at the expense of small class sizes would on net lead to worse 
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 cost-effective.  But there is some uncertainty about the benefits that would be achieved 
by such changes, and there is some downside risk associated with each of these proposals 
– particularly when one recognizes that the resources required to implement them entail 
some opportunity cost. 
In sum, the available evidence suggests to us that the Head Start program as it 
currently operates probably passes a benefit-cost test.  Changing the program in various 
ways that have figured prominently in recent policy discussions may not make the 
program any better, and could make things worse. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
student outcomes. 
  - 37 - 
 Table 1:  Intent-to-treat (ITT) Effect Sizes from the National Head Start Impact 
Study and Estimated Effects of Treatment on the Treated (TOT) 
Outcome  3 year olds 
ITT 
3 year olds 
TOT 
4 year olds 
ITT 




























































































First and third columns reproduce ITT impact estimates for all cognitive outcomes reported in Westat’s 
Executive Summary of the first year findings report from the National Head Start Impact Study, reported as 
effect sizes, i.e. program impacts divided by the control group standard deviation (Puma et al., 2005). 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses also in effect size terms; these were not included in the Westat 
report but were generously shared with us by Ronna Cook of Westat.  Second and fourth columns are our 
own estimates for the effects of treatment on the treated (TOT) derived using the approach of Bloom 
(1984), which divides the ITT point estimates and standard errors by the treatment-control difference in 
Head Start enrollment rates.  For 3 year olds the adjustment is to divide ITT by (.894 - .213) = .681, for 4 
year olds adjustment is to divide ITT by (.856 - .181) = .675 (see Exhibit 3.3, Puma et al., 2005, p. 3-7).  * 
= Statistically significant at the 5 percent cutoff. 
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